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TORT RELEASES IN WISCONSIN
HARROLD J. MCCOMAS*

Two years have passed since the Wisconsin Supreme Court, in the
case of Pierringerv. Hoger determined that joint tort-feasors could
effectively bargain for and settle claims both as to plaintiffs and as to
the contribution claims of co-defendants without certain knowledge of
the ultimate quantitative negligence apportionable among the various
defendants. The Pierringercase followed closely the case of Bielski v.
Schulze,2 which case held, as a proposition unprecendented in the law
of Wisconsin, that in the establishment of contribution rights between joint tort-feasors in Wisconsin, damages were to be ratably
allocated in proportion to the percentage of causal negligence attributable to each joint tort-feasor. The decision in Bielski v. Schulze, while
somewhat startling by reason of its inception through judicial reversal of prior case law rather than by statutory enactment, was
a reasonable and natural extension of Wisconsin's comparative negligence doctrines which had developed since the enactment of the
Wisconsin comparative negligence statute by the Legislature in
1931.3
While the Bielski decision was unequivocal in its determination,
serious questions remained in implementing its application. The question was presented as to whether, in light of prior decisions relating to
rights of contribution between joint tort-feasors, and the seemingly
absolute and mandatory provisions of the Uniform Joint Obligations
Act,4 it would now be feasible to effect settlements with fewer than all

multiple joint tort-feasors, while protecting the settling defendants from
further liability for contribution claims from nonsettling joint tortfeasors. A separate but allied question also involved the issue of whether
the settling parties could also be protected against their retention or
interpleader as nominal parties in continuing litigation between the
plaintiff and the nonsettling tort-feasors. If either of these questions
were answerable unfavorably to a settling joint tort-feasor, the effective
negotiation of settlement prior to trial would have been seriously impaired in personal injury cases involving multiple defendants.
The factual situations presented in the Pierringeractions were not
atypical of the complexity of actions which often evolve from modern
industrial accidents. Present in the case were three separate individual
*B.A., College of Wooster (1948); LL.B., Yale University (1951); partner,
Foley, Sammond & Lardner, M\ilwaukee. Wisconsin.
'21 Wis. 2d 182, 124 N.W. 2d 106 (1963).
2 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W. 2d 105 (1962).
'3irs. STAT. §331.045 (1963).
- Wis. STAT. ch. 113 (1963).
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plaintiffs, each claiming extensive personal injuries (along with their
respective workmen's compensation carriers as silent but interested and
participating entities) together with eight named defendants and interpleaded defendants. The plaintiffs' claim arose from an explosion which
had occurred on November 1, 1957 and the actions had been commenced in the middle of 1958. More than three years had been consumed following commencement of the actions in multitudinous pleadings, examinations, depositions, motions, and other procedures which
are largely unavoidable when multiple parties are involved in claims
resulting from such an intricate industrial occurrence.
As of 1962, the plaintiffs and all but one of the defendants had
come to a general agreement as to the extent and value of the plaintiffs'
injuries and the probable involvement and responsibility of the various
defendants, and had projected a basis for a proposed settlement of all
three actions. These parties were also generally agreed that the trial
of the action would involve some three to four weeks' time, that the
exposure to the individual defendants was substantial and that the
individual plaintiffs and their respective workmen's compensation carriers were willing to accept reasonable compensation rather than undergo the hazards and delay of the trial and certain appeal of the actions.
One defendant, however, was unwilling to contribute to the funds
needed to satisfy the requirements for the total settlement package in
an amount considered sufficient by the remaining defendants who had
negotiated for the total amount of the settlement payments to the three
plaintiffs.
While the settlement terms were being evolved by the many parties
to these actions during 1962, the case of Bielski v. Schulze, supra, was
announced by the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Accordingly, the defendants in the Pierringercases who were desrious of completing the
settlement were then faced with these questions, vis-a-vis the nonparticipating and nonsettling defendants: (1) Could they, under the
Bielski decision, effect a settlement which would protect them from
further damages or contribution claims from the nonsettling defendant,
while reserving to the plaintiffs their rights against the nonsettling
defendant? (2) Could they effectively obtain their dismissal from the
pending actions and continued litigation over the objection of the nonsettling defendant?
A brief review of the applicable Wisconsin statutes and case law
will indicate the nature of the problem presented. The early case of
Ellis v. Esson 5 laid much of the groundwork for further development
of the rights and obligations of joint tort-feasors in Wisconsin. In that
action, the plaintiff effected a settlement with one defendant prior to
trial and "released" the settling defendant, but provided under the

550 Wis. 138, 6 N.W. 518 (1880).

1965-661

TORT RELEASES

terms of the agreement that the plaintiff was left free to prosecute his
cause of action against the other tort-feasor for the balance of his
damages due. The common law generally had held that a release under
seal, as was the document in the Ellis case, was to be distinguished
from a covenant not to sue, and necessarily resulted in a bar to any
further action against the nonsettling defendants, as the "release" was
conclusively presumed to have been in full satisfaction and sufficient
compensation for the injury sustained. The Wisconsin Supreme Court
payed lip service to this common law rule relative to releases under
seal in Ellis, but concluded that the intent of the parties should nontheless govern. It was held that inasmuch as it appeared from the "release" that the payment received had not been in full satisfaction for
the injury, it had not been the plaintiff's intention to release the other
tort-feasors and that the nonsettling defendants would be protected
only to the extent of having the amount of payment received credited
against the damages found against tmem.
Some 32 years later, the Wisconsin Supreme Court again looked
past the term of art of a "release" contained in a document purporting
to release one of two joint tort-feasors in the case of Kropidlowski v.
Pfister & Vogel Leather Co.,6 and gave effect to the stated language in
the document (designated as a sealed release) that "said sums are received not as an accord and satisfaction for the whole injury suffered,
but only as part satisfaction thereof.7 The court then held that the
parties' intent could best be carried out by treating the settlement
agreement as a covenant not to sue, and accordingly did so.
While Wisconsin case law was developing the rule (contrary to the
rule of common law) that settlement agreements would be implemented
according to their provisions and intent, and would not automatically
bar recovery against non-settling joint tort-feasors simply because the
document was designated as a release of the settling tort-feasor, rights
of contribution between joint tort-feasors were also being developed
by the courts. Thus in Ellis v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 8 some nine years
prior to the enactment in 1927 of the Uniform Joint Obligations Act
in Wisconsin, our supreme court considered the split of authority as
to the existence of common law rights of contribution, and determined
that contribution or indemnity would lie between joint tort-feasors
except in those instances in which elements of moral turpitude, or willful or conscious wrong, might bar such recovery. Following the enactment of the Uniform Act in Chapter 113, drafting of settlement agreements, releases covenants not to sue, and indemnity agreements (and
often documents which combined elements of all of these) so that
Wisconsin's common law rights of contribution would be compatible
6 149 Wis. 421, 135 N.W. 839 (1912).

7Id. at 422, 135 N.W. at 839.
8 167 Wis. 392, 167 N.W. 1048 (1918).
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with the provisions of the various statutory sections of Chapter 113,
became increasingly difficult.
In State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Continental Cas. Co.9 the
plaintiff's husband's insurer paid the plaintiff a nominal amount ($15)
and obtained from the plaintiff a signed written instrument entitled
"Joint Tort-Feasor Release under Chapter 113 of the Wisconsin
Statutes With Indemnifying Agreement." The terms of the instrument
were such that the settling party was purportedly released from all
liability and causes of action for the plaintiff's personal injury, but the
plaintiff reserved the right to make claim for her full cause of action
against all other parties. The court found the settlement agreement in
the State Farm Mutual case to be synonymous with a covenant not to
sue, and held that it did not preclude the nonsettling defendant from
seeking contribution from the settling defendant, since the settlement
had reserved to the plaintiff her full cause of action, rather than satisfying half of the plaintiff's damages. The court also concluded that the
Uniform Joint Obligations Act was applicable and held Section 113.04,
rather than Section 113.05, applied in this instance.
The converse situation was presented in the subsequent case of
Heimbach v. Hagen,10 in which the settlement agreement executed by
the plaintiff in favor of one of two joint tort-feasors specifically provided, in addition to releasing the settling party, that the plaintiff's cause
of action was credited and satisfied to the extent of one-half thereof,
and that the settling defendant was released from any claims for contribution. Against an attempted claim for contribution brought by the
nonsettling joint tort-feasor against the settling party, the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin upheld the provisions of the settlement agreement
and particularly the provision which satisfied and discharged 50 per
cent of the plaintiff's cause of action, whatever the amount of damages
might prove to be. The court reasoned that in no event would the nonsettling tort-feasor be obligated to pay more than 50 per cent of the
verdict, since the plaintiff had already disposed of one-half of any judgment which might ultimately be entered in favor of the plaintiff. The
supreme court was apparently unable to decide satisfactorily whether
the settlement agreement was properly classifiable under Section 113.04
or Section 113.05 of the Wisconsin Statutes, and concluded that it was
not necessary to make such determination in upholding the settlement
agreement with the following language:
Whichever Section of the statutes may be applicable, defendants are discharged by the settlement to the extent of at least
one-half of plaintiff's total damages, and, therefore no right to
contribution from Calbick and her insurer can arise. 1
9 264 Wis. 493, 59 N.W. 2d 425 (1953).

10 1 Wis. 2d 294, 83 N.W. 710 (1957).
11

Id. at 298, 83 N.W. at 713; See also Kerkhoff v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 14
Wis. 2d 236, 111 N.W. 2d 91 (1961).
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While establishing the right of a settling joint tort-feasor to be
free from claims of contribution in those instances in which the settlement agreement provided that satisfaction of the plaintiff's claim
would inure to the benefit of the nonsettling defendant so that he
would not be injured by the settlement, the court also resolved the
question as to whether a settling tort-feasor was entitled to be protected from joinder in or release from participation in litigation, or
whether the nonsettling defendant could require the joinder or continuation of the settling defendant in the case as a nominal party. It
was determined that the settling defendant was entitled to dismissal
from pending actions or protection from joinder in subsequent actions,
that it was not material whether the settlement was made before or after
an action was commenced and that no possible infringement upon
procedural rights of nonsettling defendant would be sufficient to require the presence of the settling tort-feasor in the case. 2
Based upon this statutory and case history, it appears that, prior
to the decision in Bieiski v. Schulze, supra, the following determinations and procedures had been established by the Supreme Court of
V"risconsin for utilization in effecting settlement of personal injuries
involving joint tort-feasors.
1. The right of contribution of a joint tort-feasor against another tort-feasor arose in Wisconsin by operation of law upon the
making of a payment by a tort-feasor which inured to the benefit
of a joint tort-feasor.
2. The strict common law view that releases under seal operated
to discharge all other joint tort-feasors from liability was not
effective in Wisconsin when the release or settlement agreement
by its terms evinced an intention not to release joint tort-feasors.
3. The payment by a settling tort-feasor to a claimant would
not have the effect of releasing or saving the paying tort-feasor
from contribution claims brought by his joint tort-feasor if the
settlement agreement retained all causes of action of the claimant
and did not satisfy an appropriate fractional portion (Y2 in each
reported case) of the plaintiff's damages.
4. A settlement agreement would protect a settling tort-feasor
from claims of contribution if the settlement agreement adequately
provided for satisfaction and release of an appropriate portion of
the plaintiff's cause of action and ultimate recoverable judgment,
which thereby inured to the benefit of a nonsettling joint tort-feasor.
5. A payment by a defendant or supposed joint tort-feasor who
was ultimately determined not to be liable did not operate to release
12

Heimbach v. Hagen, 1 Wis. 2d 294, 83 N.W. 2d 710 (1957).

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

or discharge any of a claimant's cause of action since contribution
was necessarily predicated upon joint liability.
6. The title or designation of a settlement agreement, release,
or covenant not to sue was not deemed significant, as the Court
would look to the intention of the parties as expressed in the agreement to determine the rights of the settling parties and of the nonsettling parties.
7. The courts, along with practitioners, were unable in all instances reasonably to classify settlement agreements, releases, covenants not to sue, and indemnity agreements under appropriate sections of Chapter 113 of the Wisconsin Statutes. This was not
a substantial problem since the Uniform Joint Obligations Act, as
applied to joint tort-feasors, was considered to be largely declarative
of Wisconsin case law establishing contribution rights.
8. Settling parties who adequately provided for a release and
satisfaction of an appropriate portion of a plaintiff's cause of action
and damages could be protected both from claims of contribution
and from continuing as nominal parties in litigation.
9. The reported cases setting out these rules and procedures
had apparently never involved more than two joint tort-feasors, so
that the fractional share released, as contained in each reported
case, was always stated to be one-half of the recoverable damages
and judgment in each instance. It was considered that an appropriately worded settlement agreement and covenant not to sue could
be employed to release other fractional shares of a plaintiff's cause
of action and damages, but such agreements in the nature of
covenants not to sue invariably carried indemnity agreements as
well to protect the settling tort-feasors from possible miscarriage
of the document.
Following the decisions in Bielski v. Schulze, supra, and Pierringer
v. Hoger, supra, it appears that the general rules recited above have not
been substantially changed, other than to reflect the new concept of
prorating liability and damages among joint tort-feasors in proportion
to their liability (usually causal negligence) as finally determined in the
trial or other disposition of the action. The settling parties in the
Pierringer cases were clearly unable to predict, even approximately,
the ultimate allocation of negligence among the many participating
defendants and the nonsettling defendant. Accordingly, the agreements utilized to effectuate the proposed settlement and to prevent
its being precluded by the nonparticipating defendant provided in
essence that the plaintiffs would release all of their causes of action
and credit and satisfy all of their damages in any judgments which
might ultimately be found to be attributable to all of the settling parties,
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reserving and maintaining to the plaintiffs only that portion of their
causes of action and damages which might ultimately be held to be
attributable to the nonsettling party. A copy of the form of release
upheld in the case involving Pierringer,Hoger and Bormann is set out
in the appendix.
Approval by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin of the type of
settlement agreement utilized in the Pierringercases should be of assistance in encouraging the settlement of the increasing number of
actions and claims involving multiple joint tort-feasors in Wisconsin.
In such instances, those defendants who wish to effect a settlement
and pay for their release from liability on a negotiated basis can now
do so with the assurance that if an adequate settlement agreement
is utilized, they will be protected both from claims of contribution and
future participation as parties in any continuing litigation. Nonsettling
co-defendants will be unable to trade upon the position that unless
unwarranted concessions are made to them, they will be able to prevent
other parties from effecting settlements deemed favorable to them by
the settling parties.
Claimants will be able to make settlements with the settling parties
in those instances where agreement can be reached between them and
still retain their pro rata claims and causes of actions against nonsettling joint tort-feasors to the extent of the ultimately determined
proportionate liability of the nonsettling defendants. Nonsettling defendants will be protected in that they will benefit from a pro tanto
reduction in the recoverable damages allocable to the conduct of
settling parties, and will only be responsible for the damages attributable to their own proportionate liability in the action. Under these
circumstnaces, it appears that the policy of encouraging settlement has
been substantially fostered by the Pierringer,Hoger and Bormann
decision, and that the equitable rights of contribution are well served
by the decision in these cases.
A final note of interest is the court's determination in the Pierringer,
Hoger and Bormann case that facts relative to the conduct and ultimate negligence of settling defendants are fully determinable in appropriate special verdicts despite the absence of such settling parties
as named parties in the action. Such appeared to be the law of Wisconsin prior to these decisions, but it is considered that the Pierringer
case constitutes a square holding to this effect.
It seems equally clear that, in its decision in the Pierringercase,
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin has forever terminated its concern
with the applicability of the Uniform Joint Obligations Act, as set out
in Chapter 113, to personal injury settlements, agreements, releases,
covenants not to sue, and indemnity agreements in Wisconsin contribu-
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tion cases, since it has determined that Chapter 113 will not be applicable
in these instances unless the specific terms and provisions of the settlement agreement require its application. It is submitted that consideration
should be given to repealing Chapter 113, insofar as it pertains to
claims for contribution relating to joint tort-feasors in Wisconsin.
APPENDIX
The following is the substance of the release agreement given effect
in Pierringerv. Hoger:
(Recitals of circumstances relating to settlement agreement are
omitted.)
Now, Therefore, I, the undersigned Loschel Pierringer, for
myself, my heirs, administrators, executors, successors and assigns,
for and in consideration of the payment of the total amount of
Seventeen Thousand Nine Hundred and Sixty-four Dollars
($17,964.00) by Milwaukee Gas Light Company, Stoelting Brothers
Company, Burton E. Hoger, William Bormann, Schmitz Ready
Mix, Inc., James E. Greisch and William R. Greisch to the undersigned, the receipt of which amount is hereby acknowledged, and
other good and valuable consideration, do hereby release, remise
and forever discharge the following named persons, corporations
and firms, and their respective officers, agents, employees, successors, assigns, and insurers, and each of them, and only such
persons, corporations and firms, to-wit: Milwaukee Gas Light Company, Stoelting Brothers Company, Burton E. Hoger, William Bormann, Schmitz Ready Mix, Inc., James E. Greisch and William
R. Greisch, of and from any and all claims, demands, rights or
causes of action of whatsoever kind or nature which the undersigned has ever had or may now have or may hereafter have,
whether now known or unknown, foreseen or unforeseen, arising
from or by reason of or in any way connected with, any injuries,
losses, damages, disability, suffering, property damage or loss, or
the results thereof, which heretofore has been or hereafter may be
sustained by the undersigned as a result of or in connection with
or arising out of that certain fire and/or explosion which occurred
on or about November 1, 1957 at the Schmitz Ready Mix plant at
Port Washington, Wisconsin.
It has been represented by the undersigned that the injuries
sustained and the suffering and damages resulting therefrom by the
undersigned have persisted and that recovery therefrom is uncertain
and indefinite, and in making this release and agreement it is understood and agreed that the undersigned relies on the undersigned's
own beliefs and knowledge, and that of the physicians and attor-
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neys of the undesigned, as to the nature, extent and duration of
the symptoms and injuries.
The settlement and release made and effected hereby is a compromise settlement of the undersigned with Milwauke Gas Light
Company, Stoelting Brothers Company, Burton E. Hoger, William
Bormann, Schmitz Ready Mix, Inc., James E. Greisch and William
R. Greisch (hereinafter called the "settling parties") and neither
this release nor the payments made pursuant thereto shall be construed as an admission of liability of any of said settling parties,
the same being denied. The total damages and claims of the undersigned amount to more than the amount of the aforesaid consideration of $17,964.00 paid and credited to the undersigned herewith
by the settling parties being released hereunder, and the undersigned,
knowing that the settling parties released hereunder and herein are
not paying the total of the undersigned's full amount of damages
as would be paid if all defendants and interpleaded defendants in
said pending action, including Mathias Greisch, were settling said
action and all claims for damages of the undersigned therein, does
hereby credit and satisfy that portion of the total amount of damages of the undersigned which the undersigned has suffered and
will suffer because of the aforesaid fire and/or explosion which
has been caused by the negligence, if any, of such of the settling
parties hereto as may hereafter be determined to be the case in
the further trial or other disposition of this or any other action,
it being the act and intention of the undersigned to release and
discharge, and he does hereby release and discharge that fraction
and portion and percentage of his total causes of action and claim
for damages against all parties in said case No. 12830 pending in
said Circuit Court of Ozaukee County which shall hereafter, by
the further trial or other disposition of this or any other action, be
determined to be the sum of the portions or fractions or percentages
of causal negligence for which any or all of the settling parties
hereto are found to be liable and responsible in causing said fire
and/or explosion with respect to any finding of damages or recovery made by or for said Loschel Pierringer; and the undersigned does hereby reserve, save, maintain and preserve against
Mathias Greisch the balance of the whole cause of action of the
undersigned against the Mathias Greisch, which balance of said
cause of action is not released hereunder. Except as above specified,
the undersigned does not release Mathias Greisch from any liability
for damages and specifically reserves his rights, claims and causes
of action, as aforesaid, against said Mathias Greisch.
In further consideration of the aforesaid payment to the under-
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signed by the settling parties hereto for the damages, injuries and
claims of the undersigned, the undersigned, for himself, his heirs,
administrators, executors, successors and assigns, does hereby indemnify and agree to indemnify and save harmless said Milwaukee
Gas Light Company, Stoelting Brothers Company, Burton E. Hoger,
William Bormann, Schmitz Ready Mix, Inc., James E. Greisch
and William R. Greisch, their respective officers, agents, employees,
successors, assigns and insurors, for any amount that they will or
may be required to pay upon any judgment (exclusive of costs, if
any) obtained against them by a joint tort feasor or any party to
said action or any other party for contribution in any way arising
out of any damages of the undersigned herein resulting from said
fire and/or explosion of November 1, 1957, and all claims made by
the undersigned with respect thereto, and to satisfy any such judgment against the settling parties, and does hereby further agree,
and authorizes his attorneys to execute a stipulation thereto, to
dismiss, on the merits and without costs to the undersigned or any
of the settling parties, said actions No. 12830 and No. 12997 as
against Milwaukee Gas Light Company, Stoelting Brothers Company, Burton E. Hoger, William Bormann, Schmitz Ready Mix,
Inc., James E. Greisch and William R. Greisch.
It being understood that the undersigned Loschel Pierringer,
for himself, his heirs, executors, successors, administrators and
assigns, agrees to satisfy on behalf of the settling parties any amount
of any judgment to which he may be found to be entitled against
Mathias Greisch up to the extent of the fraction of his cause of
action hereinbefore defined and released hereunder.
The foregoing Release and Indemnification Agreement has been
read and understood by the undersigned before signing thereof.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has hereunto set
his hand and seal this 15th day of May, 1962.
/s/ Loschel Pierringer (SEAL)
Loschel Pierringer
(Acknowledgment)

